Against utilitarianism (again)

We knew this already but Johann Hari in this Hogmany piece explicitly nails his colours to the utilitarian mast. On the use of violence, for example:

"No: the only justification for using violence, ever, is a utilitarian one – to prevent even more violence occurring. To choose the least controversial example, innocent people died horrifically in the bombing of Nazi Berlin – but even more people would have died if the bombing had not gone ahead, so it was not only justified but morally necessary."

He then uses this utilitarian calculus to oppose the death penalty under any circumstances, even for Saddam Hussein - a case which he confesses to feeling ambivalent about:

"Does the relief and joy given to a once-tyrannised population outweigh the murder of a human being? No. In the end, I cannot find a morally justifiable explanation for my glee at Saddam’s death. The real test of your belief in human rights is not whether you support them for the innocent – the Marsh Arabs and the Ang Sang Su Kyis. No: it is whether you support them for the disgusting, the depraved, the genocidal – the Saddams."

I don't understand any of this. If you are a utilitarian, why shouldn't the 'relief and joy given to a once tyrannised population' serve as a perfectly good reason for welcoming Saddam's execution? The problem with utilitarianism, as every undergraduate philosophy student understands, is that it cannot in theory rule out the execution of the innocent, never mind a heinous tyrant like Saddam Hussein.

The other problem I have with this is the manner in which Johann links this calculus to war because the only way these can be justified with any degree of certitude is retrospectively. Since I began blogging, I have seen this done in relation to WW2 on a regular basis. Usually in a most ahistorical manner - as if we can know what the body count would have been had, say, the British opted for surrender after Dunkirk.

But, as Oliver Kamm has pointed out in a different context, this is a false calculus anyway because such was the nature of National Socialism, a 'barbarism without limit', that there can be no serious discussion of the consequences had we failed to defeat it.

That those who originally supported the invasion of Iraq and have subsequently recanted their position do not believe this reasoning is applicable to Iraq is something I have no problem understanding at all.

What I do have a problem understanding, though, is where they got their confidence from in the first place? Johann Hari used to be among those argued that who opposed the war should feel ashamed of themselves - now he feels ashamed for supporting it. I'd imagine this would be something of a morally-tortuous roller-coaster ride to find oneself travelling on, although I can't be sure because I don't understand the basis on which the original position was taken.

If you were a utilitarian supporter of the war, why did you do this to yourself? Given that human beings can't predict the future and that wars have especially uncertain outcomes, it was a mistake for utilitarian supporters of the war to accuse those who opposed it of being 'objectively pro-fascist', when they should have restricted themselves to the more limited charge of being 'objectively pro-disutility'. Doesn't have quite the same ring of certitude, does it?

Support your local blogs

I'm completely unconcerned with issues surrounding nationality so I don't share the worries of this young blogger:

"Why are there no real big guns in the Scottish blogosphere? And the ones that do attract attention usually aren’t writing about Scottish politics!"

Answer to a) is because in the national tradition the 'big guns' have fucked off to London; those of us that have stayed are wasted on class A drugs and alcohol. But we're okay with that, it's everyone else that has a problem, in my view. Still, I do think the Scottish blogosphere offers good stuff that isn't available in the Glasgow "most fucking boring newspaper in the history of the human race" Herald, so if you're provincially inclined visit this, and this, and this, and this, and this. Plus two adopted Jocks here and here. And we have a bona fide member of the real fleet here.

Fuck - how drunk am I?

Answer to b) is because nobody gives a fuck. Unless the SNP actually show signs of winning in May. In which case I serve notice that this blog is going into unionist overdrive. I'm voting Scottish Labour because they're the only party that can be trusted on this issue. Sad, verging on the tragic - but there it is. Happy New Year.

Kisses,

Shugs.

Chosing metaphors

Seth Freedman in Comment is Free writes:

"I'm not comfortable with the argument that those loyal to Israel shouldn't criticise it, as I have been taught over and over during my formative years (although, fortunately, not at home). Loyalty does not mean turning a blind eye - the "spare the rod..." concept is central to my uneasiness. If we do not take the opportunity to educate Israel whilst it is growing up, we'll be left with a wild, unruly adult version in 50 years' time, totally oblivious to critique or censure - which many would argue Israel already is today."

The first sentence I completely agree with. But what is central to Mr Freedman's uneasiness makes me rather uneasy too. "Spare the rod, spoil the child", the writer of the Proverbs said. Do we have here an example of the problem Western commentators have vis-a-vis the Middle East - infantalization? Better than demonization, I suppose - but still...

The writer of the Proverbs also said "the blueness of a wound cleanses the innermost parts". What would be the political implications of this, exactly?

The lynching of Saddam Hussein

While I'd agree with many of the criticisms Brian Barder has made of the execution of Saddam Hussein, taken as a whole the piece conflates two separate issues; one's attitude and opinion on the death penalty per se and how it was conducted in this case.

It is perhaps inevitable for opponents of the death penalty to say, in effect, that this form of punishment is heinous and this particular example to be especially so, given its obvious departure for recognised conventions of due process.

But I think we should strive to keep the issues separate. I too oppose the death penalty but a rejection of the utilitarian theory of punishment has left me wondering whether my continued opposition isn't really just a matter of aesthetics and prejudice.

I'm not at all sure, for example, that I could agree with Brian Berber's assertion that "all civilised people in the western world...regard all forms of capital punishment as disgusting and unacceptable".

It might be more accurate to say that most of the European middle classes find the death penalty "disgusting and unacceptable" because opposition to this form of punishment as a hallmark of 'civilisation' is both more recent and more localised than many people tend to assume and certainly was not central to the political culture that grew out of the Enlightenment.

A rejection of utilitarianism should also lead one to repudiate arguments against this execution on the grounds that it makes him look like a 'martyr', or that it made him 'look good'. Whatever the shortcomings of this process, only a moral idiot could form either of these opinions.

Neither is the recognition that the result of this trial was a 'foregone conclusion' a valid objection here. The presumption of innocence is not an act of faith but a procedural disposition, the adoption of which should not be taken to indicate that the outcome of any given trial where the evidence is as copious as it is overwhelming should somehow guarantee uncertainty of outcome.

The point of all this? There was one. It is that regardless of what one's position on the death penalty may be, there is a respectable case to be made for it on the grounds that it imputes both to the perpetrator and to the victim a concept of human worth and responsibility that is lacking in the utilitarian view of the human condition.

But what is central to this view is the notion that the law should be blind - that it should not respect persons but universal principles, and with this end in view it is essential that the institutions of a state should never deprive another human being of their life or their liberty without a due process that pays due deference to these aforementioned principles.

In this narrower sense, I'd have to concur with Brian Barder; anyone who cares about these things should indeed find the lynching of Saddam Hussein, as it has been performed, as has become available to the world in pornographic detail, an atrocious thing.

[Via Chris Dillow]

Crossposted at DSTPFW

Happy New Year

To one and all.

Congratulate me on my promotion. Retrospective - but never mind. Conor Foley linked one of my posts on Comment is Free - describing me as someone who "formerly worked at the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia".

Cool. Very tempted to go along with that - but I think I was working as a kitchen porter round about that time.